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TORTS
I. BYSTANDER RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS RECOGNIZED
In Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co.' the South Carolina
Supreme Court took another step toward the recognition of
emotional tranquility as an interest worthy of protection 2 by
holding that one who negligently causes severe injury or death to
another may be liable to a bystander who witnesses the incident
and suffers severe emotional distress as a result.3 Consequently,
South Carolina joins a majority of jurisdictions in recognizing a
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress,4 al-
though South Carolina has followed the minority view on the
proper application of the tort.'
In Kinard the plaintiff's twenty-year-old daughter was seri-
ously injured when roof trusses fell from the defendant's truck,
broke through the windshield of the car in which Mrs. Kinard
and her daughter were riding, and struck the daughter on the
head. Mrs. Kinard brought suit in federal court seeking recovery
for both her own physical injuries and for "the severe shock,
emotional trauma, and resulting physical injuries suffered as a
result of watching her child experience serious physical injury
and suffering."8 Because the district court found no controlling
1. 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985).
2. See Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981), and cases cited therein.
3. 286 S.C. at 582, 336 S.E.2d at 467. The supreme court, in Dooley v. Richland
Memorial Hosp., 283 S.C. 372, 322 S.E.2d 669 (1984), addressed a claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress, but neither rejected nor adopted the new tort.
4. For discussion of the jurisdictions recognizing recovery based on negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress arising from witnessing injury to another, see Annotation,
Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, or Shock or
Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3D 1337 (1970), and Annotation,
Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover Damages for Shock
or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4T 833 (1981).
5. A study published in 1981 identifies 10 states that hold to the position adopted
by South Carolina and 19 states that oppose it. Note, An Expanding Legal Duty: The
Recovery of Damages for Mental Anguish by Those Observing Tortious Activity, 19 Am.
Bus. L.J. 214, 219 (1981).
6. Brief of Plaintiff at 3.
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South Carolina precedent on the issue of recovery for emotional
distress, the court certified the question to the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
7
The supreme court, faced with a variety of approaches in
defining the new cause of action, chose a version of the "foresee-
ability test" first articulated in Dillon v. Legg.8 The test adopted
by the court, which restricts what could otherwise be almost un-
limited liability, requires the following elements:
(a) the negligence of the defendant must cause death or serious
physical injury to another;
(b) the plaintiff bystander must be in close proximity to the
accident;
(c) the plaintiff and the victim must be closely related;
(d) the plaintiff must contemporaneously perceive the accident;
and
(e) emotional distress must both manifest itself by physical
symptoms capable of objective diagnosis and be established by
expert testimony.9
If these five elements are satisfied, the injuries to the plaintiff
are deemed to be foreseeable, and the defendant owes a duty of
due care to the plaintiff. A breach of this duty will subject the
defendant to liability.
10
The court noted that these factors will be applied on a case-
by-case basis.11 It is through this individualized application and
the development of a body of precedent in this area that practi-
tioners will be able to glean a clearer understanding of these fac-
tors. In the years since Dillon was adopted, however, other
states have adopted and construed similar causes of action with
similar limitations. The three "proximity" requirements1 2 are
7. The question certified pursuant to S.C. Su'. CT. R 46 was "[w]hether a mother
who is herself physically injured as a result of a delict may recover damages for severe
shock, emotional trauma and resulting physical injuries caused by witnessing severe in-
jury to her daughter in the same incident?" 286 S.C. at 580, 336 S.E.2d at 466.
8. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
9. 286 S.C. at 582-83, 336 S.E.2d at 467.
10. The seminal opinion states: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the
duty to be obeyed .... ." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99,
100 (1928).
11. 286 S.C. at 582, 336 S.E.2d at 467.
12. These factors are as follows: Close proximity to the accident, close relation to
the victim, and contemporaneous perception of the accident. See generally Note, supra
note 5.
2
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common in virtually all Dillon decisions. The factors concerning
the bystander's proximity and perception have been blurred in
some cases to the point that "[i]f the observer is near enough to
the negligent act that he senses the specifics of the occurrence,
the location factor is satisfied.
1 3
In addition to the contemporaneous perception require-
ments,14 courts and commentators have examined the require-
ment of a close relationship between the victim and the plain-
tiff-witness.' 5 The remaining elements have only recently
appeared in Dillon decisions and therefore have not developed
the volume of case law of the other elements.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a
cause of action whereby a closely related bystander can recover
for negligently inflicted emotional distress, nevertheless, the
practitioner should be aware that a cause of action for "out-
rage," delineated by Ford v. Hutson,16 is available and should be
13. Note, supra note 5, at 224. This is characterized as the "'not far distant rule.'"
Id.
14. Annotation, Immediacy of Observation of Injury as Affecting Right to Recover
Damages for Shock or Mental Anguish from Witnessing Injury to Another, 5 A.L.R.4TH
833 (1981). Perhaps the clearest explanation of the contemporaneous perception require-
ment may be found in Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495
(1978) (plaintiffs came upon the wreckage of defendant's automobile "before the dust set-
tled" and knew instantly that their daughters inside were dead or dying, but were denied
recovery for lack of sensory perception of the accident); see also Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68
Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977)(victim's mother arrived on the scene within
five minutes but was denied recovery for lack of contemporaneous sensory perception).
But see Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980), in which the victim's mother
was allowed recovery where she arrived at the scene after her seven-year-old son became
trapped between an elevator's outer door and wall of the elevator shaft. While she did
not witness the accident, she did witness the unsuccessful four and one-half hour at-
tempted rescue of her son during which time he "moaned, cried out and flailed his
arms." Id. at 91, 417 A.2d at 522.
15. Annotation, Relationship Between Victim and Plaintiff-Witness as Affecting
Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing
Victim's Injury or Death, 94 A.L.R.3D 486 (1979). The courts look for the emotional
attachments of the family relation. Thus, in Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App.
3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976), the relationship between a foster parent and foster
child satisfied the relation requirement because, in part, the parent and child held them-
selves out to be related. But see Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1980) (plaintiff was denied recovery after "de facto spouse" with whom she had continu-
ously lived for three years was killed in automobile wreck caused by defendant's negli-
gence, since there was no family relationship and no allegation that defendants knew or
should have foreseen any other relationship between plaintiff and victim).
16. 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981). The tort of "outrage," known as the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress gives liability for conduct that is extreme and out-
3
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pleaded where applicable. 17 Practitioners should also note that
although the cause of action is presently limited to bystander
recovery, 8 it seems likely that a South Carolina court would, in
an appropriate factual situation, allow recovery when the emo-
tional distress was directly inflicted.',
Dean A. Eichelberger
II. MUNICIPALITY'S FAILURE TO DISSEMINATE EXECUTIVE ORDER
IS SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION OF A "POLICY" FOR SECTION 1983
ACTION
In Moore v. City of Columbia0 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed a circuit court order sustaining a demurrer to
complaints alleging a cause of action against the municipality
under Title I, section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.21 The
court of appeals held that the complaint stated a cause of action
since it alleged a de facto policy of the municipality which proxi-
mately caused the deprivation of a constitutional right.22
The action arose when Mrs. Moore's son was shot and killed
by a group of city police officers who were pursuing him. Mrs.
rageous, causing distress of an extreme or severe nature. This conduct, however, must be
so outrageous that it exceeds "'all possible bounds of decency' and must be regarded as
'atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community'. . . ." Id. at 162, 276 S.E.2d
at 778 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1979).
17. See Brief of Plaintiff at 5. One of the advantages of a claim for "outrage," also
known as the intentional infliction of emotional distress, is that punitive damages may
be available.
18. 286 S.C. at 582 n.2, 336 S.E.2d at 467 n.2.
19. Arguably, the supreme court recognized negligent infliction of emotional distress
without requiring that the plaintiff be in the "zone of danger" or suffer a contemporane-
ous impact in Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265
(1958).
20. 284 S.C. 278, 326 S.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1985).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). The court affirmed the demur-
rer to an identical complaint alleging a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982), the
civil rights conspiracy statute, noting the complaint's failure to allege the necessary "in-
vidiously discriminatory animus." 284 S.C. at 288, 326 S.E.2d at 163.
22. 284 S.C. at 286, 326 S.E.2d at 163. The court also held that the demurrer could
not be sustained on the ground that Mrs. Moore improperly pled that supervisory police
officers ordered or contributed to her son's death. The court of appeals found that Mrs.
Moore should have the right to produce evidence at trial supporting her contention that
these officers were carrying out a de facto policy of the City. Id. at 287, 326 S.E.2d at
162.
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Moore alleged that her son was unarmed, did not pose a threat
of death or serious bodily harm to police, and was not suspected
of committing a capital offense.23 She sought money damages
from the City for both wrongful death and survivorship.24
An executive order issued in 1980 permitted the use of
deadly force only in a situation in which the one being appre-
hended posed a threat of serious bodily harm or death.25 Mrs.
Moore alleged that the City's twelve-month practice of failing to
disseminate the executive order to many of its policemen consti-
tuted an indifference to the officer's use of lethal force to appre-
hend a person posing no threat to the officer's safety.26 Mrs.
Moore further alleged that the failure of the City and the super-
visory officers on the scene to enforce the order constituted a
custom of the municipality which proximately caused the depri-
vation of her son's life without due process of law.17
No substantive rights are granted by section 1983. Rather,
actions brought under the statute are remedial in nature.28 Al-
though Mrs. Moore claimed that her son's right to due process
of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment was violated,
the circuit court found that she failed to allege a policy, practice,
or custom of the City which caused the deprivation. 29
In reversing the circuit court's decision, the court of appeals
stated that a complaint properly pleads the ultimate facts be-
hind the elements of a cause of action, rather than the evidence
probative of those ultimate facts. The court held that Mrs.
Moore's complaints stated both a wrongful death and survivor-
ship action based on a violation of section 1983.1o
More importantly, the court found that the complaints al-
leged an official custom or de facto policy consisting of "the
City's twelve-month persistent practice of unreasonably failing
to disseminate the executive order to many of its policemen. '31
23. 284 S.C. at 281, 326 S.E.2d at 159.
24. Id. at 282, 326 S.E.2d at 159.
25. Id. at 281, 326 S.E.2d at 159.
26. Id. at 286, 326 S.E.2d at 161.
27. Id.
28. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
29. 284 S.C. at 285, 326 S.E.2d at 159.
30. Id. at 287, 326 S.E.2d at 162.
31. Id. at 286, 326 S.E.2d at 161.
1986] TORTS
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The court cited Monell v. Department of Social Services32 for
the proposition that the official policy required in a section 1983
action need not be a de jure policy, but may be represented- by
custom of the municipality.
3 3
Municipalities are subject to liability under section 1983.31
This liability cannot be based on respondeat superior since a
city is not considered to be at fault solely due to a tortious act of
its employee5 The critical standard embraces the notion that a
city itself must be at fault; a plaintiff must prove a municipal
custom or policy in order to receive his remedy.
3 6
Practitioners should take particular note that in this case
the alleged de facto policy involved the enforcement of vel non
of an executive order. In a recent United States Supreme Court
case, City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,7 the Court held that a
municipal policy sufficient to impose liability under Monell
could not be inferred merely from a single act of force. 8 Accord-
ing to the standard used by the Court, the custom or policy
must be the deliberate choice of the policymakers 9
In Moore the claim for damages was based on an allegation
that the City deliberately failed to disseminate an executive or-
der. In applying a liberal construction of a section 1983 cause of
action and upholding the complaint, the South Carolina Court
of Appeals has abided by the prevailing federal standard in a
suit under that section.
Amy Acheson
32. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
33. 284 S.C. at 283-84, 326 S.E.2d at 160.
34. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
35. Id. at 691-94.
36. Id. at 694.
37. 471 U.S. 808, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985)(civil rights action under section 1983
brought by widow of man shot and killed by police).
38. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2436. The Court held that a single incident of unconsti-
tutional activity must include "proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy, which can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." Id.
39. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
[Vol. 38
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III. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
DOCTRINE RECOGNIZED
In Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc. 40 the South
Carolina Supreme Court created a long-awaited public policy ex-
ception to South Carolina's century-old employment-at-will
rule.41 Justice Chandler, writing for a unanimous court, stated
that where the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee con-
stitutes a violation of a clear mandate of public policy, a cause of
action in tort for wrongful discharge arises.42 This decision
places South Carolina in line with a growing majority of states
which have adopted the public policy exception to the at-will
40. 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
41. The employment-at-will rule generally allowed an employer to discharge an em-
ployee for "any reason, or for no reason at all." Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C.
766, 769, 259 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1979). The doctrine was first proposed in 1877 by Profes-
sor H. G. Wood. See H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1st ed. 1877). Because it
reflected the principles of contract law and served the laissez faire economics of the late
nineteenth century, it quickly became the universal rule. See S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1957). For in-depth discussions on the historical development
of the doctrine, see Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am.
J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976); Vernon & Gray, Termination at Will-The Employer's Right
to Fire, 6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1980); Annotation, Employee's Arbitrary Dis-
missal as Breach of Employment Contract Terminable at Will, 62 A.L.R.3D 271 (1975).
42. 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216. This modification of the at-will rule "applies
only to this case and to those causes of action arising after the filing of this opinion,
November 18, 1985." Id. at 225-26, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
The "public policy" exception adopted in this instance began as a narrowly con-
strued doctrine that permitted employees to bring an action only when they could
demonstrate that a statute expressly prohibited their discharge. See, e.g., Kauff v. Beth-
lehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App. 2d 322, 202 P.2d 1059 (1949)(statute expressly
barred the discharge of an employee for serving as an election officer). Later cases broad-
ened the doctrine to include discharges that violate statutory codifications of public pol-
icy that do not expressly protect employees. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959)(declining to
commit perjury at employer's behest); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249,
297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)(employee terminated for filing workers' compensation claim).
Eventually, courts in a few states began to apply the public policy exception to dis-
charges that violated policy not expressed in a statute. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)(employee terminated for serving on a jury). Where employee
claims invoke private as opposed to public concerns, however, courts generally have been
unsympathetic. See, e.g., Abniss v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa
1978)(questioning an employer's integrity); Keneally v. Orgain, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d
127 (1980)(questioning employer's internal management system). See generally Decker,
At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania-A Proposal for Its Abolition and Statutory
Regulation, 87 DicK. L. REV. 477, 484 n.60 (1983).
7
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In Ludwick the petitioner, Gwendolyn Ludwick, was em-
ployed as a seamstress in respondent's sewing plant. During her
employment at Carolina, she was served with a subpoena to at-
tend a hearing before the South Carolina Employment Security
Commission. Although Ludwick's plant managers advised her
that she would be fired if she obeyed the subpoena, Ludwick
honored the subpoena and testified at the hearing. Upon re-
turning to work the next day, she was immediately fired." Con-
sequently, Ludwick brought an action against Carolina for
wrongful discharge from employment.
The trial court granted Carolina a nonsuit, and the court of
appeals affirmed the dismissal.45 The supreme court, however,
reversed and remanded. The court held that South Carolina
would recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge where
the termination of employment constituted a violation of public
43. See H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 18-19 (1984). Mounting
criticism of the at-will doctrine has led many courts to recognize several other exceptions
that require at least brief mention here. These exceptions are based on the theories of
implied contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The implied contract exception applies when employees have been told upon being
hired that they will not be terminated unless there is just cause. These assurances have
been construed as consideration for acceptance of employment by the employee and are
often found in personnel manuals, employee handbooks, and employee brochures that
explain employee benefits. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579,
292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). But see Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 178 Ill. App. 3d
117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979)(employee handbook rejected as basis for legally binding mod-
ification of the at-will rule). See generally Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Secur-
ity, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974).
Recently, a few courts have found that, as a matter of law, a right to fair dealing is
implied in all contracts, including those for employment. See, e.g., Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549, 62 A.L.R.3D 264 (1974). See generally Note, Protecting At-
Will Employment Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980). Thus far, the doctrine has been largely restricted to
situations involving long-time employees, particularly when they are terminated to pre-
vent collection of earned commissions. See, e.g., Fortune, 373 Mass. at 104-05, 364
N,E.2d at 1257. At least one court, however, has refused to distinguish between dis-
charges to deny an earned benefit and other bad faith discharges. See Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
44. 287 S.C. at 221, 337 S.E.2d at 214.
45. See Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 283 S.C. 149, 321 S.E.2d 618 (Ct.
App. 1984).
8
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The scope of the Ludwick court's holding appears to be nar-
row. The court stated that "the public policy exception is in-
voked when an employer requires an at-will employee, as a con-
dition of employment, to violate the law."'4 7 The court reasoned
that a contrary ruling would contravene the legal process estab-
lished by the legislature. 48 The limited scope of the court's hold-
ing is the result of two express concerns. First, there is a concern
that a modification of the at-will rule will spawn an outpouring
of vexatious and frivolous litigation. The second concern is that
the employer will not be unduly fettered in exercising his right-
ful prerogative to select employees.
49
After Ludwick a crucial uncertainty is whether the public
policy exception will be invoked only when an employer requires
an employee to violate the law in order to keep his job or
whether this action constitutes merely one example of the nu-
merous violations of public policy that would warrant applica-
tion of the exception. In Ludwick the court briefly mentioned
several recent South Carolina decisions that involved the retalia-
tory discharge of at-will employees for filing workers' compensa-
tion claims. The supreme court and the court of appeals deemed
that these cases were inappropriate for review of the at-will
rule. 50 This conclusion appears to indicate that the court, at
least for the present, intends to restrict its application of the
public policy exception to the facts found in Ludwick. If this is a
fair assessment of the scope of the court's holding, the number
of wrongfully discharged South Carolinians who can expect to
benefit from the newly created public policy exception is minute.
In spite of the limited scope of the Ludwick decision, the
46. 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court stated, "Here, the subpoena served upon Ludwick was issued pur-
suant to S.C. CoDE ANN. section 41-29-210 (1976) which provides a criminal penalty for
failure to obey. She was confronted with the dilemma of choosing between her livelihood,
on the one hand, and obedience to the law of the state, on the other." Id.
49. 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
50. Id. at 222, 337 S.E.2d at 215; see Hudson v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766,
259 S.E.2d 812 (1979); Corder v. Champion Rd. Mach. Int'l Corp., 283 S.C. 520, 324
S.E.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1984). This language carries with it the unfortunate implication that
employers may continue, if they so desire, to emasculate the safeguards provided by our
state's workers' compensation statutes by terminating with impunity those at-will em-
ployees who pursue benefits under these laws.
1986] TORTS
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case may at least prove to be the first cautious step towards a
more appreciable circumscription of the employment-at-will rule
in South Carolina. Given the pro-employer labor relations phi-
losophy of our courts, however, it is likely that any further modi-
fication of the at-will rule will be slow and hardfought. There-
fore, the overwhelming majority of South Carolinians who are
employed at will may have a long wait before they experience
the job security currently enjoyed by at-will employees residing
in states that have adopted broader, more palpable exceptions to
the at-will rule.51
J. Mark Jones
IV. EMPLOYER HELD LIABLE TO EMPLOYEE FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT BY CO-EMPLOYEE
In Davis v. United States Steel Corp.52 a majority of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer may be
held liable to an employee who is sexually harassed by a co-
worker if a member of the employer's supervisory staff observes
the misconduct and fails to take action to prevent further har-
assment. 3 Additionally, a different majority of the court held
that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior in South Caro-
lina, an employer would not be liable for the harassment unless
there was inaction on the part of a supervisor after he had actual
knowledge of the coemployees actions.
The plaintiff, Nanette Davis, was a secretary-receptionist at
the United States Steel facility in Bamberg, South Carolina.
During the fifteen months she worked for United States Steel,
she was the only female employee at the Bamberg plant. Davis
produced testimony that she suffered numerous indignities at
the hands of her immediate boss, Jim Bryan, who was responsi-
ble for hiring and firing employees at the facility.5 4 These activi-
51. See supra notes 42-43.
52. 779 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 211.
54. Id. at 210. During her employment, Davis was subjected to Bryan's "abusive
language, off-color and sexual jokes and innuendos, and frequent invasions of her privacy
concerning her marital and sexual relationship with her husband." Id. She also alleged
direct sexual advances by Bryan. Id.
[Vol. 38
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ties allegedly took place at the United States Steel facilities dur-
ing work hours. One of Davis' co-workers corroborated the
testimony.55 In addition, Bryan's supervisor, Jim Stoutz, pro-
vided an affidavit which stated that he personally observed
Bryan pat Davis on the posterior.56 Davis testified that Stoutz
had witnessed several such incidents and had overheard Bryan's
derogatory remarks. 57 Stoutz, however, did not speak to Bryan
about the incidents, nor did he inform his supervisors at United
States Steel about Bryan's conduct.
In Davis the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment for the defendant58 and determined
that it was possible for the plaintiff to establish a cause of action
against United States Steel based on the testimony which re-
flected that the supervisor, Stoutz, had observed Bryan's con-
duct and failed to take action.59 The court reasoned that knowl-
edge of abusive activities of an employee by a supervisor, in the
face of inaction, creates the inference that the employer did not
object to the harassing conduct and, therefore, should be held
liable for any injury suffered. 0 This theory was described by
Judge Dickson as the "negligent failure to control" theory.
6 1
The court of appeals based its holding, that actual knowl-
edge of the supervisor was required for Bryan's action to be im-
puted, on Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc.6 2 In that case the Fourth
Circuit ruled that an employer was not liable for the intentional
55. 779 F.2d at 210.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Federal jurisdiction was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (1982). Davis also asserted pendent state law claims for wrongful discharge, as-
sault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 779 F.2d at 211.
59. 779 F.2d at 211.
60. Id. at 211-12.
61. Id. at 215 (Dickson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This theory is
distinct from that of ratification since ratification would relate only to the acts prior to
the time the employer learned of the employee's conduct. Judge Phillips concluded that
the use of this theory was inappropriate since it had never been suggested by the plain-
tiff as a basis of liability. Id. Hence, neither proof nor corresponding defenses had been
presented on the issue. The judge continued that, despite the egregious nature of the
alleged misconduct, plaintiff could base his action only on common law since the plaintiff
chose to forego the more expansive substantive basis for employer liability under Title
VII. Id.
62. 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1978).
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tort of his employee." Rabon involved a factual situation in
which a company's security guard, while on duty, raped a female
employee. Judge Butzner distinguished Rabon from the Davis
case by stating in his concurring and dissenting opinion: "The
rape in Rabon was not a pervasive feature of the security guard's
performance of his job. Rather, it was an isolated act that clearly
negated the performance of the guard's duties. By contrast, a
jury could reasonably find that Bryan's acts of sexual harass-
ment were part and parcel of his supervision of Davis."64 Never-
theless, if the Davis court had made an exception to the doctrine
of respondeat superior as traditionally applied in South Caro-
lina, the court would have had to engineer its own version of the
Civil Rights Act. That action, however, is more appropriately a
legislative function.
In holding that the inactivity of a supervisor after receiving
knowledge of sexual harassment of employees can be imputed to
the company, the Davis court gave a broad reading to the tradi-
tional common-law principle of respondeat superior as applied
in South Carolina. In its quest for a fair means by which to hold
a financially responsible employer liable for the egregious con-
duct of an employee, Davis may have opened.the doors to claims
that could be better handled by federal laws that address this
type of discrimination."
Nancy E. Caldwell
V. WRONGFUL DEATH JUDGMENT UPHELD ON GROUNDS OF
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION
In 1979 a divorced, mentally ill mother who was living with
her parents shot and killed her two children while they were
staying with her for weekend visitation. Six years later, in Crow-
63. Id. at 1281-82.
64. 779 F.2d at 213 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. Unfortunately, Davis lost the more liberal, remedial interpretation of tort law
which attaches to Title VII actions when she dropped her claim under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (1982). See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 996-97
(D.C. Cir. 1977). Compare Bradley v. John M. Brabham Agency, 463 F. Supp. 27 (D.S.C.
1978)(using liberal interpretation of tort law for civil rights claim) with Rabon v. Guard-
smark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1978)(using stricter interpretation of tort law absent
federal civil rights claim).
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ley v. Spivey,"' the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
the jury reasonably could have found that the proximate cause
of the children's death was the maternal grandparents' negligent
supervision of the visit.
0 7
Lynette Spivey Crowley's mental problems with paranoid
schizophrenia began in 1971. In 1975 she and her husband,
Timothy Crowley, divorced and Lynette moved to her parents'
home in Beaufort. Her mental condition began to deteriorate in
1978 and, after she spent six weeks in a mental institution, 8
custody of the children was transferred to her husband. In Janu-
ary Timothy learned that Lynette had purchased a gun and he
refused to allow her to exercise her visitation rights. 9 A few
weeks later, Lynette and her father called Timothy and offered
assurances that Lynette had disposed of the gun. Mr. Spivey
stated that he had searched repeatedly, yet unsuccessfully, for
the gun. Agreeing to take "full responsibility" and supervise the
children's visits,70 Mr. Spivey asked Timothy to allow the visita-
tion to resume. Timothy agreed. The shooting occurred a few
weeks later.
To recover in negligence, a plaintiff must show a duty of
care owed by the defendant, a breach of that duty by a negligent
act or omission, and damage proximately resulting from the
breach.71 In Crowley the court found a duty based upon the legal
principle that one who assumes to act, even though under no
obligation to do so, may have a duty to exercise reasonable
care.7 2 By stating that the defendants were under no duty to act
66. 285 S.C. 397, 329 S.E.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1985).
67. Id. at 409, 329 S.E.2d at 781-82.
68. Id. at 403, 329 S.E.2d at 778. Lynette voluntarily committed herself to the Wil-
liam S. Hall Institute in Columbia after a doctor who had treated her, and whom she
called incessantly, obtained involuntary commitment papers. On June 9 she was released
to her parents' care with prescribed medication and an order to attend follow-up visits at
a Beaufort mental health clinic. After the shooting Mr. Spivey told the police that
Lynette had stopped taking her medication and had not been attending therapy. Id. at
405-06, 329 S.E.2d at 780.
69. Id. at 403-04, 329 S.E.2d at 778.
70. Id. at 404, 329 S.E.2d at 779.
71. Id. at 406, 329 S.E.2d at 780; Bullard v. Ehrhardt, 283 S.C. 557, 324 S.E.2d 61
(1984); Wannamaker v. Traywick, 136 S.C. 21, 134 S.E. 234 (1926); Gunter v. Granite-
ville Mfg. Co., 15 S.C. 443 (1881); Brown v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 284 S.C. 47, 324
S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. granted in part, cert. denied in part, 285 S.C. 456, 329
S.E.2d 768 (1985).
72. 285 S.C. at 406, 329 S.E.2d at 780.
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until they affirmatively agreed to supervise the visits, the court
of appeals implicitly rejected a duty that might have been im-
posed by law based on the defendants acting both as custodians
of a mentally ill person and as custodians of helpless children.
73
The court, nevertheless, in cursory treatment of the issue, found
a voluntary assumption of duty sufficient to support liability.
74
The court next addressed the problem of proximate cause.
The defendants contended that their conduct was not the proxi-
mate cause of the children's death. They argued that they were
insulated from liability by the intervening act of Lynette and
that no evidence supported the jury's conclusion that they could
reasonably have foreseen that Lynette would harm the children
as a consequence of their negligence. 75 The court rejected this
argument based on the longstanding rule in South Carolina that
the intervening act of a third party, even an intentional or crimi-
nal act, will not break the causal chain and insulate the original
negligent party from liability if "the intervening act and the in-
jury resulting therefrom are of such character that the author of
the primary negligence should have reasonably foreseen and an-
ticipated them in light of the attendant circumstances." 6 The
73. Id. The court cited Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp., 282 S.C. 415,
321 S.E.2d 46 (1984) which relied upon RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1979) in
holding that when one who is under no obligation to do so nevertheless undertakes a
duty, he is bound to proceed with due care. See also Carolina Bank and Trust Co. v. St.
Paul Fire and Marine Co., 279 S.C. 576, 310 S.E.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1983).
74. 285 S.C. at 406, 329 S.E.2d at 780. By stating that the Spiveys were not obli-
gated to act, the court may well have rejected other authority that would impute a duty
in this situation even if the Spiveys had not voluntarily assumed one. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 318, 319, 320, 324 (1965). Each of the Restatement propositions,
which could arguably apply to the facts of Crowley, imputes a duty based on the rela-
tionship of the parties whether or not a duty has been voluntarily assumed. It is signifi-
cant that the court of appeals chose to find a voluntary assumption of a duty when one
could have been easily imposed by law. For a discussion of the duties arising from these
relationships, see Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43
YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
75. 285 S.C. at 406-07, 329 S.E.2d at 780.
76. Id. at 407, 329 S.E.2d at 780 (quoting Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 161, 161
S.E.2d 171, 173 (1968)); see also Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly of St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C.
479, 483, 238 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1977)("the intervening criminal act of another may not
always relieve one of liability for his negligence"); Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124
S.E.2d 321 (1962); Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324, 11
A.L.R.2d 745 (1948); Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208 S.C. 267, 37 S.E.2d 737
(1946); Woody v. South Carolina Power Co., 202 S.C. 73, 24 S.E.2d 121 (1943); Horne v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 177 S.C. 461, 181 S.E. 642 (1935); Howell v. Union-Buffalo
Mills Co., 121 S.C. 133, 113 S.E. 577 (1923); Harrison v. Berkeley, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.)
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jury, therefore, had only to find that the Spiveys could reasona-
bly have foreseen "that the children would be at risk while with
Lynette when she was armed with a pistol... [and] was deviat-
ing from a prescribed course of treatment that was necessary for
her to lead a normal life."'77 Evidence showed that the defend-
ants had known of Lynette's mental problem since 1971, that
they were aware of her worsening condition beginning in 1978,
and that they knew of the effect that failure to take the pre-
scribed medication would have on her.1s Furthermore, the
Spiveys had testified that it was common sense that Lynette
should not have a pistol and that they had searched for the pis-
tol so that they could have "peace of mind" when the children
visited. 9 These facts, coupled with Timothy's obvious goal of
protecting the children when he prohibited visitation, led the
court to conclude that the danger to the children was, in fact,
foreseen. s0
Although Crowley does not change the longstanding South
Carolina negligence formula, it recognizes its application in a
novel fact situation. Previously, when a duty to protect the
plaintiff from the foreseeable intervening negligence or criminal
acts of a third party had been found, some other pre-existing
legal relation, usually of a contractual nature, had been present
between the plaintiff and defendant.8' The South Carolina Su-
525 (1847); Accordini v. Security Cent., Inc., 283 S.C. 16, 320 S.E.2d 713 (Ct.App. 1984).
77. 285 S.C. at 408, 329 S.E.2d at 781.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Accordini v. Security Cent., Inc., 283 S.C. 16, 320 S.E.2d 713 (Ct. App.
1984)(defendant burglar alarm installer was found liable for property stolen when an
alarm he had installed failed to operate); see also Green v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry.,
131 S.C. 124, 126 S.E.441 (1925)(railroad company was held liable for injuries sustained
by one of its employees who was shot by robbers in the course of his employment). The
ruling in Green was on appeal from an order overruling a demurrer. The South Carolina
Supreme Court heard the case again, 135 S.C. 147, 132 S.E. 172 (1926), on a motion
pertaining to pretrial matters, and again, 151 S.C. 1, 148 S.E. 633 (1928), on appeal from
judgment on the merits. The last opinion was reversed per curiam by the United States
Supreme Court, 279 U.S. 821 (1929). It is not clear whether the specific holding in the
opinion cited was overturned by the Supreme Court. South Carolina courts have repeat-
edly cited this opinion without referring to the Supreme Court's disposition. Several
years later the Supreme Court in Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947), held for the
plaintiff in a case very similar to Green. But see Ayers v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 208
S.C. 267, 37 S.E.2d 737 (1946), where defendant's driver parked a bus on a highway at
night in violation of a safety statute. Although no contractual relation existed, the court
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preme Court has imposed a duty upon a defendant to protect a
plaintiff against foreseeable intervening forces when there was
an employer-employee relationship 2 a vendor-vendee relation-
ship, 3 or when a more specific duty to the plaintiff already ex-
isted by operation of law.8 4 Likewise, when there is no special
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the court has
found intervening intentional acts to be superseding causes.85
By finding liability in the novel facts of Crowley, the court
of appeals has established that one who assumes a duty, though
under no obligation to do so and though otherwise in no special
relationship with the plaintiff,"6 will be liable for injury caused
by a breach of that duty. This breach may include the foresee-
able acts, intentional or negligent, of a third party.
John Keitt Hane III
VI. STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF NURSING HOME
CIRCUMSCRIBED
In Flinn v. Crittenden17 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that a nursing home has no duty to provide continu-
ous, individualized patient supervision.8
Flinn brought this suit under section 15-75-20 of the South
Carolina Code,89 seeking damages for loss of consortium. He al-
leged in his pleadings that the defendant nursing home operator
breached its duty of care to the plaintiff's wife by allowing the
daughter to take her from the facility.90 The defendant de-
stated that a specific duty owed to the plaintiff was within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 277, 37 S.E.2d at 741.
82. Howell v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 121 S.C. 133, 113 S.E. 577 (1923).
83. Accordini, 283 S.C. at 16, 320 S.E.2d at 713.
84. Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321 (1962)(one negligent in causing
a highway to be blocked owes a duty to warn others using the highway of the danger).
85. Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, Inc., 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324 (1948); Lewis v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 167 S.C. 204, 166 S.E. 134 (1932).
86. The court did not acknowledge a special custodial relationship between the de-
fendants and the plaintiff or the defendants and the intervening party that would im-
pose a specific duty by operation of law. See supra note 74.
87. 287 S.C. 427, 339 S.E.2d 138 (Ct. App. 1985).
88. Id. at 430, 339 S.E.2d at 139.
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-20 (1976) provides for recovery of loss of "companion-
ship, aid, society and services of his or her spouses."
90. 287 S.C. at 428, 339 S.E.2d at 138. The plaintiff's wife in Flinn was admitted for
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murred and moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted.91
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision and
framed the issue succinctly: "Did the nursing home neglect its
duty?" 2 In affirming the summary judgment in favor of the
nursing home operator, the court stated that the facility is
obliged to provide a reasonable standard of care, but this stan-
dard does not require the nursing home to provide continuous,
individualized patient supervision.93 The court implied that such
a higher duty could be created contractually through a mutual
agreement between the parties regarding special care.94
Amy Acheson
VII. SOUTH CAROLINA RECOGNIZES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF
SISTER STATE
In Newberry v. Georgia Department of Industry and
Trade5 the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over a nonconsenting sister state. This decision
care to the defendant's nursing home facility, the Oakmont Nursing Center, in April
1982. Id. at 429, 339 S.E.2d at 139. On April 9, 1982, Flinn signed a release agreement
that obligated the home to provide "only general duty nursing care" and specifically
excluded a duty to provide "continuous or special duty nursing care." Id. In November
1982 the plaintiff's wife was taken from the nursing home by her daughter and moved to
Mississippi. Id. at 428, 339 S.E.2d at 139. The court later found that there was "no evi-
dence that the mother was forceably [sic] removed." Id. at 429, 339 S.E.2d at 139.
91. Id. at 429, 339 S.E.2d at 139.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 430, 339 S.E.2d at 139. In Flinn the court of appeals implicitly adopted
the reasoning of Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 29 (La. Ct. App. 1974). In that
case, the plaintiff's husband escaped from the defendant nursing home and was subse-
quently hit and killed by an automobile. Id. at 30. The trial court held that the nursing
home was liable for negligence. Id. at 31. Thus, the issue on appeal was whether the
nursing home breached its duty" of care by permitting Mr. Murphy, the decedent, to
leave the home's facilities unattended. The court reasoned that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was inapplicable to the facts and stated that "there is no presumption of negli-
gence on the part of the institution merely because of the injury to a patient." Id. at 34.
Furthermore, in holding that there was no duty breached, the court concluded that the
institution "gave as much care and attention to Murphy's needs and safety as could be
reasonably expected without assigning a special nurse or attendant to him around the
clock which clearly was not within the understanding of either party at the time he was
admitted." Id. at 36.
94. Id.; see Murphy, 295 So. 2d at 36.
95. 286 S.C. 574, 336 S.E.2d 464 (1985).
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places South Carolina with a distinct minority of jurisdictions
that recognize the right of a sister state to assert the defense of
sovereign immunity.96
The defendant in Newberry operated a trade show that pro-
moted Georgia tourism in Columbia, South Carolina. The plain-
tiff, while attending the show, tripped over an electrical cord
and was injured. She subsequently brought suit in South Caro-
lina state court, pursuant to South Carolina's long-arm statute,
9 7
alleging negligence on the part of the defendant. At trial the de-
fendant demurred on the ground of sovereign immunity, but was
overruled. The South Carolina Court of Appeals,98 citing the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Nevada v. Hall,99 af-
firmed the decision of the trial court. The court of appeals indi-
cated that it was adopting the rule followed by the majority of
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of whether a sister
state can rightly assert the defense of sovereign immunity.10
The Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and
overturned the decision of the court of appeals.
The supreme court based its decision upon three policy con-
siderations. First, the court recognized that the rule adopted by
the court of appeals would encourage forum shopping by pro-
96. See infra note 100.
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
98. 283 S.C. 312, 322 S.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1984).
99. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). In Hall the Supreme Court held that the State of California
was free to assert jurisdiction over the State of Nevada, despite the latter's retention of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity within its own jurisdiction. The Court stated that the
decision of whether to deny or grant immunity to a sister state ultimately rests within
the discretion of the forum state: "It may be wise policy, as a matter of harmonious
interstate relations, for States to accord each other immunity or to respect any estab-
lished limits on liability. They are free to do so." 440 U.S. at 426.
100. 283 S.C. at 318, 322 S.E.2d at 215. The court cited the following cases as estab-
lishing the "majority rule": Peterson v. Texas, 635 P.2d 241 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981);
Streubin v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1982); Mianecki v. Second Judicial Court, 99 Nev.
93, 658 P.2d 422 (1983); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574,
404 N.E.2d 726, 427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980); see also Qasim v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 455 A.2d 904 (D.C. 1983); Wendt v. County of Osceola, Iowa, 289 N.W.2d
67 (Minn. 1979); cf. Martin v. Educational Testing Serv., 179 N.J. Super. 317, 322-23,
431 A.2d 868, 870 (1981)(the court noted in dicta that if squarely faced with the issue, it
"perceive[d] no jurisdictional bar" to a suit against a sister state). But see Ramsden v.
Illinois, 695 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. 1985)(en banc)(declining to exercise jurisdiction over de-
fendant State of Illinois); cf. Maroon v. Department of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980)(applying a statute of a sister state based upon authority of Nevada
v. Hall).
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spective plaintiffs.' 01 Second, the court sought to avoid "tension"
between the states that could result from the refusal of one state
to recognize another state's sovereign immunity.10 2 Last, the
court discussed the more tangible, realistic threat arising from
the possibility that Georgia might remove its assets from South
Carolina in an attempt to avoid a levy against them by one seek-
ing to enforce a judgment. 0 3
The decision is interesting for several reasons. Initially, one
should certainly recognize the supreme court's refusal to follow
the majority of jurisdictions that deny sovereign immunity to
sister states' 04 and its articulation of the policy reasons that sup-
port this decision. 0 5 Equally interesting is the court's apparent
departure from earlier decisions that seem to construe South
Carolina's long-arm statute' 6 rather broadly.'0 7 Furthermore, it
is intriguing that the supreme court refused to entertain suit
over a sister state within a mere six months of the court's aboli-
tion of sovereign immunity in South Carolina; 08 a decision in
which the supreme court recognized the overall devolution of
this ancient doctrine.
10 9
Nevertheless, the supreme court's decision to respect the
101. The problem of forum shopping is manifest if a plaintiff, foreclosed from suit
in a sister state because of that state's sovereign immunity, is allowed to travel to South
Carolina and bring suit in this forum. 286 S.C. at 575, 336 S.E.2d at 465.
102. This aspect of the court's opinion stresses "comity" between the states. Id. at
576, 336 S.E.2d at 465.
103. The plaintiff's prayer in the present case was for $9900 in actual damages. Rec-
ord at 6.
104. See supra note 100.
105. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (1976).
107. See, e.g., Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 270 S.C. 570, 243 S.E.2d 451
(1978) (nonresident architect who designed building while outside of the state held sub-
ject to jurisdiction of South Carolina in suit alleging negligent design of building); Engi-
neered Prods. v. Cleveland Crane & Eng'g, 262 S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921 (1974)(foreign
corporation held subject to jurisdiction of South Carolina in a case involving plans fur-
nished by the corporation for manufacture of products, components of which were
fabricated in South Carolina).
Additionally, the court in Newberry failed to hold that the defendant was amenable
to suit even though the defendant was allegedly involved in the "commission of a tor-
tious act." See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(c) (1976).
108. See McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985); see also South Caro-
lina Tort Claims Act, 1986 S.C. Acts -, No. 463 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
78-10 to -170 (1976)).
109. 285 S.C. at 245, 329 S.E.2d at 742 (court noted that 36 other jurisdictions had
abolished sovereign immunity in whole or in part).
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sovereign immunity of nonconsenting states appears expressly
permissible in light of Nevada v. Hall."' The soundness of the
court's judgment is questionable only insofar as one disagrees
with its underlying policy bases."'
Bert Glenn Utsey III
VIII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ABOLISHED
In McCall v. Batson"2 the South Carolina Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity from liability for
tortious conduct. The court, however, declined to extend the ab-
rogation to the acts of legislative, executive, and judicial entities,
or to public officials endowed with discretionary authority en-
gaged in the commission of their duties.113 By this ruling, South
Carolina joins a majority of states that have partially or com-
pletely abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity.14 McCall
110, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
111. The opinion of the court of appeals offers a variety of persuasive alternative
policies for those who do not concur with the supreme court's position. See Newberry v.
Georgia Dep't of Indus. and Trade, 283 S.C. 312, 332 S.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1984).
112. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
113. Id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 742.
114. For jurisdictions that have partially or totally abrogated the doctrine by judi-
cial decision, see Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961);
Proffitt v. State, 174 Colo. 113, 482 P.2d 965 (1971); Platt Bros. v. City of Waterbury, 72
Conn. 531, 45 A. 154 (1900); Mayor of Dalton v. Wilson, 118 Ga. 100, 44 S.E. 830 (1903);
Lundahl v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 338, 303 P.2d 667 (1956); Eastern Ill. State
Normal School v. City of Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N.E. 573 (1916); Haney v. City of
Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1964); Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & En-
ters. Co., 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973); Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976);
Higginson v. Treasurer of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523 (1912); Pittman v. City of
Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 247 N.W.2d 512 (1976); Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235
N.W.2d 597 (1975); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); John-
son v, Muncipal Univ. of Omaha, 184 Neb. 512, 169 N.W.2d 286 (1969); Merrill v. City of
Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378 (1974); Willis v. Department of Conservation &
Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970); Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d
1153 (1975); Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 104 N.E.2d 866 (1952); Thacker
v. Board of Trustees, 35 Ohio St. 2d 49, 298 N.E.2d 542 (1973); Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd.
of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973); Becker v. Beaudoin, 106 R.I. 562, 261
A.2d 896 (1970); Memphis Power & Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 112
S.W.2d 817 (1937); Town of Stockbridge v. State Highway Bd., 125 Vt. 366, 216 A.2d 44
(1965); Hewitt v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 377, 113 P. 1084 (1911); Long v. City of
Weirton, 158 W. Va. 741, 214 S.E.2d 932 (1975); Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 214
N.W.2d 405 (1975); Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976).
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also represents the completion of a recent judicial trend abolish-
ing parental and charitable immunities in South Carolina.115 In
response to the McCall decision, the South Carolina General As-
sembly enacted the South Carolina Tort Claims Act,116 which
"qualified and limited liability" of the State and its political
subdivisions for torts committed by the government, its employ-
ees, and agents, acting within the scope of official duty.
117
The plaintiff, a minor, was sexually assaulted by a classmate
while attending school in Greenville County. The plaintiff
brought suit against his teacher, Batson, alleging intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. He also sued the School District of
Greenville County, alleging negligent failure to provide adequate
supervision.1 The defendants demurred on the ground that the
cause of action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity.11 9 The trial court overruled the demurrers. The supreme
court affirmed and remanded for trial.
The McCall court reasoned that in the minority of jurisdic-
tions which recognize the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it is
an anachronism.120 The court recognized that although the ini-
tial reason for the adoption of the doctrine was the states' finan-
cial inability to remunerate rightful damage claims, there was
now more concern with the fundamental tenet of law that liabil-
ity follows tortious conduct. 2' The court also stated that stare
decisis did not prevent constructive change since continued ad-
herence to the rule would sustain inequity.122 The court stated
that although the legislature had acted to modify the doctrine,
its exceptions were incongruous and inadequate.1 23 Furthermore,
the court reasoned that "[t]he doctrine, being court-created,
115. Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980)(abolishing parental immu-
nity); Fitzer v. Greater Greenville South Carolina Y.M.C.A., 277 S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 230
(1981)(abolishing charitable immunity).
116. 1986 S.C. Acts -, No. 463 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-10 to -170
(1976)).
117. Id. (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20(a), (b) (1976)).
118. Record at 1.
119. Id.
120. 285 S.C. at 245, 329 S.E.2d at 742.
121. Id. at 253, 329 S.E.2d at 746 (Chandler, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 255-56, 329 S.E.2d at 747 (Chandler, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 245, 329 S.E.2d at 742 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-7-70, 57-5-810 to
-860 (1976)).
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may be court-abrogated. 1 24
Prior to McCall, abrogation of the doctrine in South Caro-
lina required legislative action.12 5 McCall overcomes judicial re-
luctance to proceed without initial reform by the legislature and
attempts to implement the dissenting opinions in a line of su-
preme court decisions which have favored decisional abroga-
tion.126 This judicial abrogation, nevertheless, is limited. In cases
filed on or before July 1, 1986, recovery is conditioned upon the
defendant's having liability insurance coverage. If the defendant
is covered, recovery is then constrained by the insurance policy
amount. 27 The court clearly delays the full effect of the decision
in order to permit legislative intervention.22 The legislature re-
sponded by enacting the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, which
took effect on July 1, 1986.129 The McCall court's concern with
liability insurance coverage, however, indicates that it would ap-
prove a statutorily restricted damage recovery. 30 The Tort
Claims Act, in fact, specifically limits recovery to stated dollar
amounts.13' A ceiling on the liability of the governmental
124. Id. at 258, 329 S.E.2d at 749.
125. See Torts, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REV. 218, 222
(1982).
126. See Copeland v. Housing Auth. of Spartanburg, 282 S.C. 8, 316 S.E.2d 408
(1984); Belue v. City of Spartanburg, 276 S.C. 381, 280 S.E.2d 49 (1981); Lyon v. City of
Sumter, 272 S.C. 359, 252 S.E.2d 118 (1979); Boyce v. Lancaster County Natural Gas
Auth., 266 S.C. 398, 403, 223 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1976). In his dissenting opinion in Lyon,
Justice Ness stated:
I would abolish the sovereign immunity doctrine in its entirety and hold
prospectively that where an individual suffers a direct, personal injury or prop-
erty loss proximately caused by the negligence of a governmental unit or its
employee while acting within the scope of employment, the injured individual
may recover for the wrong.
272 S.C. at 365, 252 S.E.2d at 121.
127. 285 S.C. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 743.
128. Id., 329 S.E.2d at 742.
129. 1986 S.C. Acts -, No. 463, § 8.
130. The court evinced this concern when it abolished the common law doctrine of
parental immunity. Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 136, 268 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1980)("More-
over, this Court is not blind to the existence of universal automobile liability insurance.
An injured daughter suing her automobile driver father, is, in reality, a daughter suing
her father's insurer. Although the existence of liability insurance does not translate into
automatic liability, it is a relevant factor to be considered by this Court in evaluating the
continued vitality of a court-created common law doctrine.").
131. The Act provides in pertinent part
(a) [L]iability shall not exceed the following limits:
(1) No person shall recover in any action or claim brought hereunder a
sum exceeding two hundred fifty thousand dollars because of loss arising from
22
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tortfeasor, however, creates a class which is treated more favora-
bly than other tortfeasors not protected by such a limitation.
Whether this restriction amounts to an improper classification
in violation of the equal protection clause of the South Carolina
Constitution 3 2 and the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution 3" is undetermined."
The South Carolina Supreme Court's view of the equal pro-
tection clause is exemplified by two recent decisions. In Marley
v. Kirby'35 the court held that "limitation of the operation of the
South Carolina statute [adopting comparative negligence] to
motor vehicle accidents renders the provision constitutionally
defective."' 13 The court delineated an equal protection standard
which requires a rational relationship between the exclusion of a
class and the objective sought to be accomplished by the stat-
ute. 37 The. court used the same standard in Broome v.
Truluck'3s to invalidate a statutory scheme limiting the liability
of a class. The statute' 9 provides immunity to architects, engi-
neers, and contractors from liability for negligence in the erec-
tion of improvements after ten years from the time of renova-
tions. Owners and manufacturers are excluded from the immune
class. The court found no reasonable justification for preferen-
tial treatment of the class. It is unclear whether the court would
a single occurrence regardless of the number of agencies on political subdivi-
sions involved ....
(2) The total sum recovered hereunder arising out of a single occurrence
shall not exceed five thousand dollars regardless of the number of agencies or
political subdivisions or claims on actions involved ....
(b) No award for damages under this chapter shall include punitive or exem-
plary damages or interest prior to judgment.
1986 S.C. Acts -, No. 463 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (1976)).
132. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
133. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
134. McKenzie v. S.C. Highway Dep't, 276 S.C. 461, 463, 279 S.E.2d 609, 610
(1981)(Ness, J., dissenting) (" '[O]nce sovereign immunity has been waived, legislative en-
actments must conform to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the state
and federal constitutions.' Therefore, the legislature still possesses the power to impose
ceilings. However, these ceilings shall not create improper classifications in violation of
the state and federal constitutions.")(quoting Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 95 Wis. 2d 1,
289 N.W.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980)).
135. 271 S.C. 122, 125, 245 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1978).
136. Id. at 125, 245 S.E.2d at 606; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976).
137. Id.
138. 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978).
139. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (1976).
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find the limited liability of governmental entities reasonable us-
ing this standard. If, however, the purpose of abolishing the doc-
trine is to remedy damages caused by wrongful acts of the State,
then an artificial limit on the State's liability does not appear to
have a rational basis.
Since McCall and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act re-
tain immunity regarding acts of legislative, executive, and judi-
cial entities and acts of public officials vested with discretionary
authority, 40 the question arises concerning when the state will
be amenable to suit. In Long v. Seabrook14 1 the court distin-
guished between the exercise of discretionary power by an offi-
cial of a governmental entity and the mere execution of ministe-
rial duties by a functionary. The authority to commit a
discretionary act involves "the exercise of reason in the adapta-
tion of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or
whether the act shall be done or the course pursued. ' 142 It is
unclear whether the same test would be used in a suit seeking to
hold a public official liable for negligence in his representative
capacity.
By abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, South
Carolina aligns itself with a majority of jurisdictions that have
limited sovereign immunity in some manner. McCall reflects the
South Carolina Supreme Court's intention of balancing the in-
terest of the aggrieved individual in compensation against that
of the State in the free exercise of judgment in the execution of
its governmental duties.
Amy Acheson
IX. NEW SOUTH CAROLINA DOG BITE RULE
In Hossenlopp v. Cannon14" the South Carolina Supreme
Court rejected the state's 135-year-old dog bite law"4 and em-
140. 285 S.C. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 742; 1986 S.C. Acts -, No. 463 (to be codified at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(a) (1976)).
141. 260 S.C. 562, 197 S.E.2d 659 (1982)(holding that the Board of Assessment Con-
trol of the Tax Assessor exercised discretionary power and did not merely perform a
ministerial function in its dissemination of information to taxpayers).
142. Id. at 568, 197 S.E.2d at 662.
143. 285 S.C. 367, 329 S.E.2d 438 (1985).
144. The rule was established in M'Caskill v. Elliott, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 196 (1850).
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braced the statutory rule of California1 45 which imposes liability
upon the owner of a biting dog regardless of the dog's former
disposition or the owner's knowledge of any prior vicious acts.'
46
The supreme court prefaced its adoption of the new rule by not-
ing its reversal of the common law presumption that dogs are
not harmful until proven otherwise; yet, it disclaimed the impo-
sition of strict liability in tort under the new rule. 4 ' The South
Carolina General Assembly responded to the Hossenlopp deci-
sion by enacting section 47-3-110, which codifies the new rule
adopted by the court.' 
4
Four-year-old Eric Hossenlopp was at the home of a baby-
The rule placed liability on the owner of a biting dog if he knew, or should have known,
that his dog was of a vicious or mischievous disposition.
145. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3342 (West 1970).
146. The court quoted from a jury instruction which was based upon the statute.
The quoted portion of the instruction read:
The law of California provides that the owner of any dog which bites a
person while such person is on or in a public place or is lawfully on or in a
private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, is liable for such
damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless of whether or not
the dog previously had been vicious, regardless of the owner's knowledge or
lack of knowledge of any such viciousness, and regardless of whether or not the
owner has been negligent in respect to the dog, provided, however, that if a
person knowingly and voluntarily invites attack upon himself [herself], or if,
when on the property of the dog owner, a person voluntarily, knowingly, and
without reasonable necessity, exposes himself [herself] to the danger, the
owner of the dog is not liable for the consequences ....
California Jury Instructions-Civil (1950 Supp.).
147. The court noted: "[The California Rule] is short of the rule of strict liability for
dogs." 285 S.C. at 372, 329 S.E.2d at 441; see also Couillard v. Hawkins, 285 S.C. 463,
330 S.E.2d 293 (1985).
148. The new statute provides:
Whenever any person is bitten or otherwise attacked by a dog while the person
is in a public place or is lawfully in a private place, including the property of
the owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care or keeping, the
owner of the dog or other person having the dog in his care of keeping is liable
for the damages suffered by the person bitten or otherwise attacked. For the
purposes of this section, a person bitten or otherwise attacked is lawfully in a
private place, including the property of the owner of the dog or other person
having the dog in his care or keeping, when the person bitten or otherwise
attacked is on the property in the performance of any duty imposed upon him
by the laws of this State, by the ordinances of any political subdivision of this
State, by the laws of the United States of America, including, but not limited
to, postal regulations, or when the person bitten or otherwise attacked is on the
property upon the invitation, express or implied, of the owner of the property
or of any lawful tenant or resident of the property. If a person provokes a dog
into attacking him then the owner of the dog is not liable.
1986 S.C. Acts, -, No. 343 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110).
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sitter on the day of his injuries. He and a playmate were in the
yard when the Cannon's dog, which had roamed from their
nearby house, charged toward the two and attacked Hossenlopp,
who suffered bite wounds to his leg and ankle.
The trial judge, applying the traditional South Carolina dog
bite law, 149 held that Cannon's knowledge of the dog's previously
exhibited vicious propensities left no material issue of fact and
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The su-
preme court affirmed the grant of summary judgment based
upon the state's traditional dog bite rule and also affirmed on
the basis that, in light of the California rule, the conventional
South Carolina rule was antiquated.
150
The court's primary reason for favoring a more stringent
rule was the eradication of a "paradoxical situation"' 51 caused
by a state statute 52 that placed greater liability on the parents
of minor children who caused property damage than on dog
owners in the same situation.1 53 In adopting the new rule, how-
ever, the court has actually adopted a liability greater than that
of the parental liability statute, which requires proof of malice
and limits damages to one thousand dollars.154 Although the
court had foreshadowed the abolition of the common-law rule in
earlier cases,155 the court's propriety in choosing Hossenlopp as
a vehicle for such action is questionable since liability was pre-
149. See supra note 144.
150. 285 S.C. at 367, 329 S.E.2d at 441. The court cited S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 8, which
provided authority to sustain a trial judge's decision upon any ground appearing in the
record. The only such ground appearing in the Hossenlopp record is a reference to Reed
v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 286 S.E.2d 384 (1982), in Judge Maring's order for summary judg-
ment. Record at 18. In discussing the common-law dog bite rule applied in Reed, Judge
Maring noted: "[Tihe Supreme Court set forth what it said was an antiquated rule
..... " Record at 20. Neither of the parties raised the issue in their briefs.
151. 285 S.C. at 371, 329 S.E.2d at 441.
152. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-30 (1976)(amended by S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-34 (1985)).
153. The statute reads in pertinent part:
When any unmarried minor under the age of seventeen years and living
with his parent shall maliciously and intentionally destroy, damage or steal
property,. . . the owner of such property shall be entitled to recover from such
parent of such minor actual damages . . . in an amount not exceeding one
thousand dollars ...
Id.
154. Id.
155. Cf. Conoley v. Riel, 279 S.C. 521, 309 S.E.2d 291 (1983)(indicating a needed
change in existing law); McQuaig v. Brown, 270 S.C. 512, 517, 242 S.E.2d 688, 690
(1978)(Littlejohn, J., concurring)(advocating adoption of the California rule).
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sent under the existing rule. Justices Harwell and Gregory raised
this point in their dissents.1"
Until Hossenlopp, South Carolina had followed the com-
mon-law rule frequently referred to by the misnomer, "the one-
bite rule. '157 Under this rule, there could be no liability on the
owner of an attacking dog absent some prior notice to the owner
that the dog was of a vicious or mischievous nature. The com-
mon-law rule carried with it a presumption that a domestic
animal is not dangerous until proven otherwise.15 The new rule
apparently presumes against such passiveness by viewing the
animal as vicious and imputing knowledge of this trait to its
master; hence, scienter need not be proven to impose liability.
The new rule has been treated extensively in the California
courts. California cases reflect that the rule does not impose ab-
solute or strict liability, since they allow for the traditional negli-
gence defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. 59 This distinction is not entirely clear from the face of the
California statute, but is indicated in its paraphrased form
found in the aforementioned jury instruction which clearly im-
plies the defense of assumption of risk and perhaps that of con-
tributory negligence.' The difference between the two probably
explains an earlier rejection by the South Carolina Legislature of
a reworded version of the California rule' 6' and subsequent judi-
cial adoption of the rule in its paraphrased jury-instruction
form. 6 2 The newly enacted statutory version of the rule16 3 clari-
156. 285 S.C. at 372-73, 329 S.E.2d at 441-42; see also S.C. House Bill 3200
(1983)(legislature's rejection of a bill roughly equivalent to the California statute).
157. The term "one-bite rule" derives its appellation from a misapprehension of the
common-law basis of liability. While a previously nonviolent dog may be allowed "one
bite" before the owner has notice of his dangerous propensities, other mischievous or
violent traits of his nature may provide notice to his owner prior to even one bite. For a
discussion of this misinterpretation, see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 14.11, at 836 (1956).
158. See, e.g., Mungo v. Bennett, 238 S.C. 79, 119 S.E.2d 522 (1961)(stating that the
old rule was to apply to all domestic animals).
159. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Elite Dry Cleaners, Dyers and Laundry, 127 Cal. App. 2d
479, 274 P.2d 17 (1954).
160. See supra note 146.
161. See cases cited supra note 155. The bill, like the California statute, contained
no provision relating to defenses.
162. This analysis produces a distinction between the California rule and strict lia-
bility which may not be entirely real. While the California courts continue to pay lip
service to the concept of contributory negligence as a defense to the dog bite statute, see
1986] TORTS 239
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fies the ambiguities in the supreme court's holding"" as well as
codifying other judicial interpretations of the California Stat-
ute;"6 5 however, the statute also breaks new ground166 which may
prove to create another "paradoxical situation" in South Caro-
lina dog-bite law.
167
The new rule will not be restricted to "bite" cases, but will
apply to all cases of property loss or personal injury caused by a
dog.16 Like its California counterpart, the newly adopted rule
supra note 157, they do not seem to apply it as such. There are apparently no California
cases holding a plaintiff contributorily negligent in an action based upon the statute or
any case3 defining the scope of the defense as applied to the statute. See also-Smythe v.
Schacht, 93 Cal. App. 2d 315, 321-22, 209 P.2d 114, 118 (1949)(construing the predeces-
sor statute to the current statute, CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. act 384a (Deering 1931)) (same
content as present statute and inviting the conclusion that contributory negligence is not
a proper defense to the statute since liability under the statute is not predicated on
negligence). Thus, it may be a vast logical leap to assume that California actually applies
contributory negligence as a defense to the statutory rule and that South Carolina will,
therefore, follow suit. While assumption of risk is clearly inferable as a defense to the
California rule given the language of the earlier-quoted jury instruction, see supra note
146, it serves as no distinction between the rule and strict liability in South Carolina
since it is a valid defense to strict liability claims in this state. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-73-20 (1976)(applying the defense of assumption of risk to strict products liability
claims). Hence, considering the contributory negligence defense to be effectively nonexis-
tent and the assumption of risk defense as no ground to distinguish the new rule from
strict liability, the supreme court's line dividing the two forms of liability becomes in-
creasingly blurred.
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110 (1976).
164. For example, the statutory version of the rule explicity provides the owner with
a defense if the victim "provokes [the] dog into attacking him." Id.
165. The new rule, like the California rule, will apply to "other person[s] having the
day in [their] care or keeping." Id.; see O'Rourke v. Finch, 9 Cal. App. 324, 99 P. 392
(1908).
166. The new law will impose liability on a dog-owner when the victim of the bite is
on the owner's property by invitation from "any lawful tenant or resident of the prop-
erty." SC. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110.
167. The addition of liability when the victim is upon the owner's land by invitation
of another resident of the property is probably necessary when applied to family mem-
bers of the owner. Nevertheless, the statute's extension beyond family members' invita-
tions and its addition of tenant invitations may even lead to cases of owner liability for
"negligent selection of tenant," or for greater potential liability on dog-owning landlords
than that upon landlords which rent buildings with faulty wiring. See Young v. Morrisey,
285 S.C. 236, 329 S.E.2d 426 (1985).
168, The court recently recognized that the new rule applied where a dog caused a
motorcycle accident. Couillard v. Hawkins, supra note 147. The old rule had previously
applied to this situation. See, e.g., Giles v. Russel, 255 S.C. 513, 180 S.E.2d 201 (1971).
Thus, it seems that the rule will apply in all cases involving property injury in which the
former rule applied. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-3-110 (applying the rule to bites and
other "attack[s)").
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retains the traditional negligence defenses. Unresolved by the
case and the statute, however, are the issues of whether the new
rule will apply to all domestic animals 69 and what type of liabil-
ity the court will impose.
Bert Glenn Utsey III
169. See supra note 157.
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